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8TATEMEMT OP PACTS 
The additional facts set forth by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing (the "Department") in its brief 
are generally accurate. Petitioner raises, however, the 
following points: 
In discussing the Department's denial of Medicaid benefits 
on behalf of Jody Bleazard, the Department notes that, "Ms. 
Bleazardfs resources exceeded allowable limits under the 
medically-needy program" (Brief of Respondent, p. 4). Shauna 
Bleazard (Jody's mother) is not a person of substantial resources 
(R. at 69), and the resources attributable to her ($9,642) would 
not cover even one-third of Jody's bill for March 1992 at Primary 
Children's Medical Center ($30,000)(R. at 69, 59). Nevertheless, 
it is undisputed that Shauna Bleazard's resources exceed the 
limits for eligibility under the medically needy program. The 
issue in this case is not Shauna Bleazard, however, but her 
daughter.1 The Department has not disputed the fact that Jody 
Bleazard's resources, not including those of her parents, do not 
exceed the limits for eligibility under the medically needy 
program. The issue in this case is whether Jody was a resident 
In its Brief, the Department notes that Jody Bleazard 
sought Medicaid assistance under a variety of theories (Brief of 
Respondent, p. 2-4). Given the complexity of the Medicaid rules 
and regulations, the fact that she could not initially determine 
the proper category of Medicaid for which she was eligible should 
not have been used against her by the Department, nor should it 
be used against her by this court. 
2 
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of Primary Children's Medical Center in March 1992, in which case 
the resources of her parents would not be attributable to her. 
Jody Bleazard also notes that the initial conclusion of the 
hearing officer in this matter was in her favor (R. at 47-49). 
This determination was set aside by the Interim Executive 
Director of the Department (R. at 43-46) . It is from the 
Director's Order that this appeal is made. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In response to the arguments raised by Jody Bleazard in 
support of her claim for Medicaid benefits during March 1992, the 
Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing 
("Department"), contends that Jodyfs interpretation of the 
Department's rules is precluded by federal regulation. It argues 
that those regulations require (1) the determination that Jody 
was not a resident of Primary Childrenfs Medical Center and (2) 
the consideration of a parent's income to determine the 
eligibility of a minor child for Medicaid. In its support, 
however, the Department cites only federal regulations which are 
either inapplicable to Jody's claim or unsupportive of the 
Department's position. Thus, its argument must fail. 
The Department also argues that its rules regarding 
residency in an institution should not apply to an acute care 
hospital. As this has no support in statute, regulation or rule, 
it also must fail. 
3 
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In opposing Jody's claim, the Department ignores the federal 
regulation perhaps most applicable to this situation. It allows 
the Department to determine, by rule, whether an applicant's 
resources include those of her parents. 42 C.F.R. § 435.821. In 
Utah, by agency rule, the resources of a parent should not be 
attributed to a minor child who is a resident of a medical 
institution. APA Manual, Volume III-M, § 485(3).2 Because Jody 
Bleazard was so situated, and her resources do not exceed the 
limits for eligibility, she is entitled to Medicaid benefits for 
March 1992. 
ARGUMENT 
In opposition to Jody Bleazard's claim for Medicaid 
benefits, the Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing ("Department") contends that it was bound by federal 
regulation to determine that Jody Bleazard was not a resident of 
Primary Children's Medical Center and to consider the resources 
of Jody's parents in evaluating her eligibility (Brief of 
Respondent, pp. 10-11; 15-19). As this argument has no legal 
basis, the decision of the Department should be reversed. 
2Citations to the APA Manual refer to the rules generated by 
the Department of Human Services for administration of the 
Medicaid program. These rules, compiled in several volumes, are 
referred to as Assistance Payments Administration (APA) Manuals. 
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I. THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON WHICH THE DEPARTMENT RELIES 
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
In support of her claim for benefits, Jody Bleazard relied 
on state Medicaid rules and regulations which provide that an 
eligible resident of an institution is entitled to benefits. In 
response, the Department does not dispute Jody's interpretation 
of these rules, but argues that federal regulations prevent the 
application of the Rules as written. 
Jody Bleazard does not dispute that the administration of 
the Medicaid program is governed in part by federal regulations 
and that these must be considered in evaluating an individual's 
eligibility for benefits. The regulations cited by the 
Department, however, do not modify the or address the 
Department's rules, address residency in an institution or 
require consideration of the resources of Jody's parents. In 
arguing that federal regulations preclude Jody's claim, the 
Department ignores its own rules to suit its own purposes. 
Inasmuch as this is "the essence of arbitrary and capricious 
action", the Department's action must be reversed. State v. Utah 
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980). 
A. Section 435.831 of 42 C.F.R. does not Govern or Affect 
Jody Bleazardvs Claim. 
The Department begins its argument with section 435.831 of 
42 C.F.R., which provides that: "The agency must deduct amounts 
that would be deductible in determining eligibility under the 
State's [Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)] Plan." 
5 
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As is obvious, this provision says nothing about Jody's residency 
or the resources of her parents. It simply provides that in the 
evaluation of her eligibility, available resources should be 
reduced by certain amounts. Given Jody's lack of resources, 
however, this provision would seem to have no application to this 
case. 
B. Sections 435.711 and 435.712 of 42 CF.R. do not Affect 
Jody Bleazard's Claim Because they Only Apply to Claims 
of Categorically Needy Individuals. 
The Department next cites sections 435.711 and 435.712 of 42 
C.F.R., which provide that "the agency must apply the financial 
eligibility requirements of the State's AFDC plan," 42 CF.R. § 
435.711, and "the agency must consider income and resource of 
spouses or parents as available to the individual whether or not 
they are actually contributed, if they live in the same 
household."3 42 CF.R. § 435.712. From these the Department 
attempts to establish that "all applicable federal regulations 
and state rules governing the question of residency in AFDC 
cases" apply to Jodyfs claim (Brief of Respondent, p. 18). The 
Department is in error in several important respects. 
First, the sections cited do not incorporate AFDC residency 
requirements. They address only "financial eligibility 
3The Department does not elaborate on this language, which 
seemingly supports its position. As will be demonstrated below, 
however, this language applies only to categorically needy 
individuals. 42 CF.R. §§ 435.700-435.740. It does not apply to 
persons like Jody whose claims are based on medical need. 42 
CF.R. SS 438.800-435.852. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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requirements11, 42 C.F.R. § 435.711, referring to the calculation 
of income and resources and level of eligibility. Thus, the 
Department's attempts to incorporate AFDC residency requirements 
into its determination are not supported by the regulation it 
relies on. 
Additionally, and more importantly, sections 435.711 and 
435.712 do not apply to this case. As was noted in Jody 
Bleazard's initial Brief, these sections apply exclusively to the 
eligibility of categorically needy individuals. 42 C.F.R. §§ 
435.700-435.740. Jody's claim is based upon her status as 
medically needy, Utah Admin. Code R513-333-302(1), eligibility 
for which is governed by separate regulations. 42 C.F.R. §§ 
435.800-435.852. Thus, the Department cannot rely on the 
regulations which it cites. 
C. Section 233.90 of 45 C.F.R. does not Affect Jody 
Bleazard's Claim Because it is an Inapplicable AFDC 
Regulation and Because it Addresses a Distinct and 
Separate Issue. 
Having attempted to establish that AFDC residency 
regulations govern this case, the Department next cites an AFDC 
regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90, the only such regulation on which 
it relies. The regulation provides in relevant part that MA home 
exists so long as the relative exercises responsibility for the 
care and control of the child, even though ... the child ... is 
temporarily absent from the customary family setting." The 
Department uses this language to argue that so long as Shauna 
7 
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Bleazard exercised care and control over her daughter, Jody could 
not be a resident of Primary Children's Medical Center. 
The section cited, however, cannot support the Department's 
position for several reasons. First, this is not a Medicaid 
regulation, but an AFDC regulation. As was discussed above, the 
Department has not demonstrated that AFDC regulations should 
apply to eligibility of medically needy individuals residing in 
institutions. 
Further, the regulations which the Department cites for the 
proposition that AFDC regulations apply to Medicaid eligibility 
refer only to "financial eligibility requirements". This section 
does not deal with financial eligibility, or even residency, but 
serves to aid in the definition of "dependent child". See 42 
U.S.C. 606(a). While that definition is relevant for purposes of 
AFDC, it is not a requirement of eligibility for Medicaid. Thus, 
the provision should not be used to deny Jody her benefits. 
Finally, the Department's interpretation is flawed. The 
regulation provides that a home can exist, thereby preserving the 
family's right to AFDC benefits, even though a child is 
temporarily absent, so long as a parent maintains care and 
control of the child. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90. The Department 
contends that this means a child cannot qualify as a resident of 
an institution so long as a parent exercises care and control 
over the child. The Department ignores the fact that it is 
dealing with distinct programs and situations. The rule governs 
the eligibility of a family for AFDC benefits. In contrast, Jody 
8 
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is an individual seeking Medicaid benefits. The rule governing 
the family cannot be applied to the individual. Thus, the 
Department makes an unsupported leap to its conclusion. 
D. The Department's Reliance on its own Rules is 
Ineffective Because the Rules on which it Relies are 
Taken out of Context. 
Finally, the Department refers to statements from its own 
rules governing Medicaid eligibility. These explain that a child 
and relative are "living with" each other even if one is 
"temporarily absent" from the home. APA Manual, Volume III-M, §§ 
305-2(1), 305-3(4). While there is language in these provisions 
that seemingly supports the Department's position, their context 
indicates that they do not provide a legitimate basis for denial 
of Jody's benefits. These come from rules dealing with caretaker 
relatives, persons who become eligible for "F" Medicaid as the 
caretakers of other eligible individuals. See 42 C.F.R. § 
435.301(b)(2)(ii); APA Manual, Volume III-F, § 305-3. If Jody's 
parents were seeking "F" Medicaid as caretaker relatives, these 
would be relevant. As they are not, however, these sections do 
not apply. 
Additionally, these sections do not support the Department's 
position. Although they express the idea that a caretaker 
relative is living with an individual even during temporary 
absences, including those for medical treatment, they do not 
define "temporary absence." The Department argues that an 
9 
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absence is temporary unless a parent relinquishes care and 
control.4 The rules do not discuss care and control. 
The rules do provide, however, that a person who enters an 
institution becomes a resident of the institution beginning the 
month after entry, which residency continues until the month of 
discharge. APA Manual, Volume III-F, S 215-3. In construing 
statutes and regulations, "The meaning of a part of an act should 
harmonize with the purpose of the whole act. Separate parts of 
an act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the 
act.11 Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 
906 (Utah 1984); Ferro v. Utah Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 
507 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Department's interpretation does 
not harmonize or consider the relevant rules in this case, which 
would limit a temporary absence from the home to those situations 
in which an individual is admitted and discharged from an 
institution in the same month or in the month following. As that 
did not occur in this case, the Department cannot claim that Jody 
was not a resident of Primary Childrenfs Hospital based on 
temporary absence from the Bleazard household. 
4In addressing Jodyfs claim below, the Department cited a 
Social Security regulation that provided that a temporary absence 
occurs when an individual "leaves a household but intends to, and 
does, return in the same month or the month immediately 
following." 20 C.F.R. S 416.1167(a). Under this definition, 
Jody was not temporarily absent from her home. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. The Department's Attempt to Distinguish Acute Care 
Hospitals and Other Institutions is not Supported by 
Existing Law. 
As a final note, the Department argues that Jody's 
eligibility is also in question because Primary Children1s 
Medical Center is an acute care hospital (Brief of Respondent, p. 
20). The Department would argue that a person can become a 
resident of an institution only if that institution is akin to a 
licensed nursing care facility. 
While the Department offers distinct statutory definitions 
for a licensed nursing care facility and a general acute care 
hospital, Utah Code Ann. SS 26-21-2(8); 26-21-2(14), the rules 
governing eligibility for Medicaid make no such distinction. An 
"institution" is a entity with an owner, manager or other person 
in charge that provides food shelter and some treatment and 
service to its residents that is designed to proved for four or 
more people. APA Manual, Volume III-F, § 215-1. The Department 
has conceded that, "hospitals are in fact institutions." (R. at 
54). 
F. Summary 
Thus, none of the regulatory provisions cited by the 
Department in support of its contention that federal regulations 
required it to determine that Jody Bleazard was not a resident of 
Primary Children1s Medical Center are applicable to this case. 
Neither do the rules used by the Department provide support. As 
the rules unambiguously provide that Jody Bleazard is entitled to 
Medicaid benefits, the Departments action should be reversed. 
11 
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II. FEDERAL REGULATIONS DO MOT REQUIRE THE DEPARTMENT TO 
CONSIDER THE RESOURCES OF JODY BLEAZARD'S PARENTS IN 
DETERMINING JODY'S ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS. 
In referring to various federal regulations, the Department 
fails to mention or refer to the regulation most relevant to this 
case. Contained in section 435.821 of 42 C.F.R., it deals 
directly with responsibility of relatives of medically needy 
individuals. It provides that: "The agency may consider income 
and resources of spouses or parents as available to the 
individual even if they are not actually contributed to the 
individual.11 42 C.F.R. § 435.821 (emphasis added). This 
regulation, giving the state discretion to attribute resources of 
a parent to a child, is in contrast to the mandatory attribution 
of resources between parent and child for categorically needy 
individuals, the irrelevant statute cited by the Department. 42 
C.F.R. § 435.712. 
The significance of this regulation is that in determining 
Jody Bleazard's eligibility for Medicaid, the Department is not 
bound by federal regulation to consider the resources of Jody's 
parents. Because the Department's rules provide that those 
resources should not be considered for individual's in Jodyfs 
situation, the Department committed reversible error in denying 
Jodyfs benefits based on her parent's resources. 
12 
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III. THE MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY RULES OF THE DEPARTMENT 
PROVIDE THAT JODY BLEAZARD WAS A RESIDENT OF PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER IN MARCH 1992, THAT THE 
RESOURCES OF HER PARENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN 
EVALUATING HER ELIGIBILITY, AND THAT SHE IS ENTITLED 
FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS FOR MARCH 1992. 
The Department has presented no relevant authority in 
support of the proposition that its rules should be interpreted 
otherwise than as written. Although it attempts to invoke 
regulations governing AFDC and categorically needy individuals, 
these do not apply to Jody Bleazard, who seeks benefits as a 
medically needy resident of Primary Children's Medical Center. 
The Department's rules provide that an individual becomes a 
resident of an institution beginning the month after she enters 
the institution and continuing through the month before she 
leaves the institution. APA Manual, Volume III-F, § 215-3. Jody 
entered Primary Children's Medical Center in February 1992 and 
was discharged in April 1992. Thus, during March 1992, she was a 
resident. 
For minor residents of an institution, the income of parents 
is counted only for the months of entry and discharge. APA 
Manual, Volume III-M, § 485(3). Thus, for March 1992, the income 
of Jody's parents would not be attributed to her. 
It is undisputed that Jody's resources, not including those 
of her parents, do not exceed the limitations for Medicaid under 
the medically needy program. Thus, Jody is entitled to benefits 
for March 1992. Utah Admin. Code R513-333-302(1). The 
Department has failed to show compelling grounds to depart from 
13 
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its rules; it should be held to them. State v. Utah Merit System 
Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
As it did prior to this appeal, the Department has searched 
for various rules and regulations to justify its action in 
denying Medicaid benefits to Jody Bleazard. The Department has 
failed, however, to cite any relevant authority supporting its 
position. Instead, it cites unsupportive and irrelevant 
regulations which only serve to obscure the purpose and intent of 
the rules. 
The rules of the Department provide that an individual in 
Jody's circumstances is entitled to Medicaid benefits. The 
Department's decision denying those benefits should be reversed. 
DATED this Z0rA day of April, 1993. 
DAVID B. ERICKSON 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
BV M \ ^ 
David B. ^Eryrtcson 
David J. Hardy 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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